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AUTONOMY 
 
 
Gideon Parchomovsky* and Alex Stein** 
 
Personal autonomy is a constitutive element of all rights. It 
confers upon a rightholder the power to decide whether, 
and under what circumstances, to exercise her right. Every 
right infringement thus invariably involves a violation of its 
holder’s autonomy. The autonomy violation consists of the 
deprivation of a rightholder of a choice that was rightfully 
hers—the choice as to how to go about her life. 
 
Harms resulting from the right’s infringement and from the 
autonomy violation are often readily distinguishable, as is 
the case when someone uses the property of a rightholder 
without securing her permission or, worse, causes her 
bodily injury. At other times, however, the two harms 
overlap, as in the case when a rightholder is unlawfully 
barred from exercising her free speech right or is denied 
the right to vote.   
 
Furthermore, the autonomy harm may sometimes exceed 
the physical harm sustained by the victim, as is the case in 
many sexual harassment incidents. At other times, 
however, the victim’s physical harm or economic loss will 
outweigh the autonomy harm, as is often the case in 
automobile accidents.  
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Even though autonomy violations are omnipresent and the 
harm resulting from them can be severe, the law rarely 
recognizes a cause of action for violations of autonomy, nor 
does it provide redress for autonomy harms. The current 
legal approach to autonomy protection can best be 
characterized as anomalous and unprincipled. Therefore, 
from a normative perspective it is untenable. 
 
In this Essay, we set out to make three novel theoretical and 
doctrinal contributions. First, we advance a comprehensive 
jurisprudential account of the relationship between rights 
and autonomy. Second, we show why existing law should 
be replaced with a legal regime that respects and protects 
individual autonomy in all cases. Finally, we develop a 
remedial framework designed to address autonomy 
violations. 
 
Mindful of administrability constraints, we incorporate 
three limitations to ensure that our proposal does not 
overwhelm the court system: (a) suits for autonomy 
violations would only be allowed when the plaintiff has a 
cause of action originating from the defendant’s 
infringement of her recognized legal right; (b) any such suit 
would undergo a strict de minimis scrutiny; and (c) no double 
recovery would be allowed in cases in which the plaintiff’s 
autonomy harm is subsumed in her physical or economic 
loss.  
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Introduction 
Every right has an autonomy component at the very heart of it. The 
autonomy component bestows upon the rightholder the freedom to 
choose whether, and under which circumstances, to assert the 
relevant right against duty-bearers. It also confers upon the 
rightholder the power to transfer the right to third parties, when 
such transfers are legally permitted. Stated differently, the autonomy 
component of rights protects the rightholder from coercive 
interferences by others. Isaiah Berlin famously defined autonomy as 
imposing a requirement that a person be “an instrument of [her] 
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own, not other men’s acts of will.”1 On Berlin’s view, which we 
employ throughout this Essay,2 an individual must be the ruler of 
her legal right in order for the right to exist as hers, free of 
interference by other persons or by the government.3 This feature of 
autonomy is embedded in its etymology that combines autos (self) 
with nomos (rules).4  
 
Autonomy is not an incidental feature, or a byproduct, of rights. 
Quite the contrary: it is their very foundation. In his important 
philosophical essay, “Are There Natural Rights?,” H.L.A. Hart 
powerfully argued that if there is one natural right shared by all men 
and women, it is the right of any responsible human being “to 
forbearance on the part of all others from the use of coercion or 
restraint against him.”5 According to Hart, the only reason to 
suspend this right is if one is attempting to use it to coerce, restrain 
or injure another person.6 And, while Hart employs the language of 
liberties and freedom, it bears emphasis that the ultimate interest he 
underscores as deserving protection is choice or autonomy—the 
capacity of responsible agents to make decisions for themselves. 
Hart’s analysis indicates that non-autonomous holding of rights is 
impossible both operationally and conceptually. 
 
In light of the importance of autonomy, one would expect the legal 
system to provide effective protection to autonomy and remedy its 
violations. Yet, the current legal regime concerning autonomy 
violations is confused and internally inconsistent. Worse yet, it is 
fundamentally misconceived from a deontological perspective.  
 
In the vast majority of cases, where a plaintiff can show that she 
suffered physical or proprietary harm as a result of her right’s 
violation, she will be fully compensated for her losses, but will receive 
no remedy for the violation of her autonomy. For example, when 
                                                   
1  ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 131 (1969). See also GERALD 
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 13 (1988) 
(discussing Berlin’s conception of autonomy). 
2  See in particular Section I.A. below. 
3  BERLIN, supra note 1, at 131-33. 
4  DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 12. 
5  H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 175 (1954). 
6  Id. 
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Oliver uses Ann’s property without her permission, or worse, causes 
her bodily injury, Ann will receive full compensation for her 
property or bodily harm. However, she will receive no compensation 
whatsoever for the fact that her autonomy was violated by Oliver’s 
incursion or attack. In standard cases, harms to autonomy incidental 
to violations of other entitlements fall by the wayside, neglected and 
unobserved, even when they are substantial and cannot be brushed 
aside under the de minimis doctrine.7 Yet, in a very small group of 
outlier cases, where the plaintiff fails to prove tangible harm, judges 
and juries—who ordinarily fail to see autonomy violations—award 
damages for harms to autonomy.8 These occasional sightings of the 
right to autonomy typically yield nominal damages to the plaintiff, 
as befits trifle violations of rights. Only in rare cases will courts use 
these nominal awards as a platform for awarding punitive damages 
to the lucky plaintiff.9 
 
In this Essay, we reexamine the relationship between autonomy and 
rights in order to advance a new legal approach to autonomy 
violations. Specifically, we seek to make three contributions to legal 
theory: conceptual, normative, and applicative. Conceptually, we 
demonstrate that every violation of a right invariably involves harm 
to autonomy, represented by the deprivation of choice suffered by 
the rightholder. Autonomy thus ought to be understood as a second-
order right: the rightholder’s entitlement to do with her primary, or 
first-order, right as she deems fit. Normatively, we take the position 
that substantial harms to autonomy ought to be recognized and 
remedied in all cases in which a duty-bearer deprives the rightholder 
of the power to decide whether and when to exercise her right. Based 
on this insight, we develop a normative claim that lawmakers should 
recognize autonomy violations as actionable harms in all, but de 
minimis, cases. We then devise a comprehensive remedial scheme 
for righting autonomy violations. Finally, we propose a way to apply 
our core normative recommendation by advancing a remedial 
mechanism that allows courts to remedy harm to autonomy without 
overburdening the judicial system.  
 
                                                   
7  See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
8  See infra Section II.C. 
9  See infra Section II.B. 
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The contributions this Essay makes differ from prior philosophical 
and legal investigations of autonomy. Prior work on autonomy has 
elucidated the relationship between autonomy and constitutional 
doctrine10 and identified the role of autonomy in the design of 
property,11 contract12 and other core legal institutions.13 These 
contributions, while no doubt important, focus on particular isolated 
aspects of the relationship between autonomy and law.14 
Specifically, they demonstrate how different legal institutions 
promote individual autonomy.15  
                                                   
10  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 
(1994) (analyzing aspects of autonomy promoted by the constitutional right 
to free speech). 
11  See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law 
Values, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1264-65 (2014); Carol M. Rose, Property as the 
Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 345 (1996). Frank I. 
Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA 
L. REV. 1319, 1329 (1987). 
12  See, e.g., Robin Kar, Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 806 
(2016) (associating realization of individual autonomy with the goals of 
contract law); Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A 
Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 101, 104 (2005) 
(discussing autonomy-based rationales of contract law); CHARLES FRIED, 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2, 20-
21 (1981) (stating that autonomous individuals can freely choose to impose 
obligations upon themselves in the form of contracts). 
13  See, e.g., Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 167-77 
(2017) (associating individuals’ right to autonomy with remedies for wrongful 
interference with their reproductive choices); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends 
With Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 208-09 (2007) (stating that modern 
family law promotes, inter alia, individual autonomy); Jana B. Singer, The 
Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1508 (describing “the 
migration from constitutional to family law of notions of individual privacy 
and autonomy”). 
14  One contribution we found mentions in passing a possible argument that 
autonomy underlies all rights in private law, but declines to endorse that 
argument. See Barker, ‘Damages Without Loss’: Can Hohfeld Help?, 34 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 639-40 (2014). 
15  See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1309, 1316 (2015) (“The metagoals of consumer law include consumer 
decisional autonomy in the marketplace. ...”); James Edelman, The Meaning of 
Loss and Enrichment, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 211, 236 (Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell & 
James Penner, eds., 2009) (rationalizing the law of unjust enrichment as 
protecting asset owners’ autonomy); Thomas O. McGarity & Elinor P. 
Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employment Screening, 59 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1025-26 
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Our goal in this Essay is more ambitious. We set out to develop a 
comprehensive jurisprudential account of the autonomy-law 
relationship by showing that autonomy is a core component of every 
legal right. Moreover, our account reveals that the relationship 
between autonomy and rights is bidirectional: autonomy is not 
merely a goal of legal rights but is also—and perhaps primarily—the 
rights’ operating engine. Finally, we translate our theoretical 
investigations into a set of new legal rules that respect and protect 
individual autonomy. 
 
Structurally, the Essay unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we explicate 
the concept of autonomy as a second-order right, discuss its 
centrality to legal theory and demonstrate our claim that every 
violation of a right entails harm to autonomy. In Part II, we review 
the current legal approach to injuries to autonomy, expose its flaws 
and inconsistencies and explain why it fails to do autonomy justice. 
In Part III, we develop our normative claim that calls for 
remediation of all autonomy violations that are not de minimis and 
then explain how compensation for autonomy harms can be carried 
out expeditiously by the legal system. In Part IV, we raise and 
respond to three potential objections to our reform proposal. A short 
Conclusion follows. 
 
I. The Place of Autonomy in Rights 
A. The Concept of Autonomy  
Autonomy has two important, yet distinct, aspects: primary and 
secondary.16 The primary, or definitional, aspect of autonomy 
identifies the autonomy’s point of realization. Under this 
conceptualization, a person is truly autonomous when she chooses 
how to live her life according to her will and self-determined goals.17 
                                                   
(1981) (“The preservation of  individual autonomy is at the heart of our state 
and federal employment discrimination laws.”). 
16  JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369-72 (1986) (distinguishing 
between autonomy and the capacity for it). 
17  Id. at 144, 370-71. 
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Put differently, a person exercises her autonomy when she alone 
“define[s] [her] nature, give[s] meaning and coherence to [her life] 
and take[s] responsibility for the kind of person [she is].”18 To put 
herself in this position, a person must use unfettered reflection in 
order to scrutinize her “preferences, desires and wishes” and decide 
whether she genuinely elects to retain them rather than substitute 
them with a different set of wants.19 According to this definition, 
autonomy is an important and conceptually distinct subset of 
liberty.20 
 
The definition of autonomy does not fully obtain in the real world 
for all persons. The extent to which a person can actually make 
autonomous choices crucially depends on her individual capacities 
and life conditions. These two factors represent the secondary, or 
operational, aspect of autonomy.21 For example, a person cannot 
make autonomous choices when her mental capacity is seriously 
impaired or when she experiences a severe emotional breakdown.22 
By the same token, a person may be unable to realize her 
autonomous choice to become a violinist when she cannot play 
violin or when she must work at two jobs in order to provide for her 
family.23  
 
Critically for purposes of this Essay, life conditions affecting a 
person’s autonomy also include her interactions with other 
                                                   
18  See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 20. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  RAZ, supra note 16, at 372. See also Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism 
in Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1114-22 (1989) (analyzing 
and criticizing Raz’s account of autonomy). 
22  RAZ, supra note 16, at 372-73 (“If a person is to be maker or author of his own 
life then he must have the mental ability to form intentions of a sufficiently 
complex kind, and plan their execution. These include minimum rationality, 
the ability to comprehend the means required to realize his goals, the mental 
faculties necessary to plan actions, etc.”). See also Robert R. Roca, Determining 
Decisional Capacity: A Medical Perspective, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1196 
(1994) (stating that “serious psychiatric symptoms” compromise the person’s 
“capacity for autonomous choice”).  
23  See, e.g., Wendy A. Bach, Flourishing Rights, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1071 
(2015) (detailing how poverty undermines individual autonomy). 
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individuals.24 These interactions are indispensable for any person 
striving to live a safe, healthy, meaningful and prosperous life and to 
maintain satisfying relationships with other people.25 Many of these 
interactions involve mutual commitments and undertakings that 
find their expression in people’s private orderings—for example, in 
contracts, deeds, and articles of association—and in general laws. By 
engaging in such interactions, a person changes the scope of her 
autonomy and the scope of the autonomy of the individuals with 
whom she interacts. Some of those changes expand the person’s 
autonomy while others limit it. The rights and duties of a person thus 
reveal how autonomous she is in her relations with other people. An 
acquisition of a right enhances its holder’s autonomy. Conversely, 
any addition of duties makes their bearer less autonomous.  
 
This interconnection between rights, duties and autonomy is 
unsurprising. Legal rights make their holder more autonomous by 
allowing her, at a minimum, to choose between realizing and not 
realizing the right. For example, a property owner may choose to 
exercise her right to exclude others from her property in order to 
secure her exclusive enjoyment of the property or for any other 
reason.26 Alternatively, she may elect to allow other people to come 
to her property. Reasons supporting this choice may include the 
owner’s self-gratifying generosity or desire to form good social and 
business relations with her visitors. Similar options are also open to 
the holders of inalienable entitlements, ones that cannot be sold or 
otherwise transferred to other people.27 For example, holders of the 
inalienable right to vote in a presidential election are allowed to 
choose whether to realize this right or do something else on Election 
                                                   
24  See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 8 (1989). 
25  Id. at 30. 
26  See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Wis. 1997) 
(owners exercised the right to exclude because of fear of compromising their 
ownership pursuant to the rule of adverse possession). 
27  See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) 
(analyzing inalienability and connecting it to personhood); Lee Anne Fennell, 
Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009) (examining inalienability 
rules). 
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Day. Rights unaccompanied by their holders’ autonomous power to 
make this choice cannot be properly categorized as rights.28  
 
Duties are the correlatives of rights.29 Any duty enforceable by law 
therefore necessarily limits its bearer’s autonomy. For example, 
when Joan chooses to exercise her right to free speech,30 the 
government has a duty31 not to interfere.32 Similarly, when Paula 
selects to exercise her contractual right to have David repay the loan 
she gave him,33 David becomes obligated to pay her the requisite 
amount. Under both scenarios, the duty bearer’s autonomy becomes 
more limited. The government may want to prevent Joan from 
speaking or even punish her for what she said, but, instead, it must 
tolerate her speech. Similarly, David must use the money in his bank 
account to repay the loan he received from Joan even though he 
would rather buy himself a new car.  
B. Autonomy as a Component  of Rights 
The straightforward correlation between autonomy and rights does 
not fully reveal the relationship between the two. Autonomy is not 
just a consequence of right-holding; it is also a constitutive 
component of every right. Autonomy is, therefore, best understood 
as a second-order right: an individual’s basic entitlement to choose 
whether, when and how to realize her first-order rights and to have 
those choices protected against unwelcome interferences by other 
people.34  
 
                                                   
28  Because compulsory rights are intertwined with a duty enforceable by law, 
they are best understood as imposing a caregiving or paternalistic obligation 
on the bearer of the duty.  
29  See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913). 
30  Under Hohfeld’s taxonomy, this right is categorized as a “privilege.” See id. 
31  In Hohfeldian terms, this duty constitutes “no right.” Id. at 32-33. 
32  Id. at 35. 
33  Here, Paula would invoke a claim-right in Hohfeldian terms. See id. at 30. 
34  For a similar idea, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 171 
(1974) (observing that a central core of a person’s right in X is “the right to 
determine what shall be done with X”). 
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The view we endorse is illustrated by the Connecticut Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brett v. Cooney.35 The case involved an attorney 
who purchased the plaintiffs’ house at a fair and agreed-upon price, 
representing to the plaintiffs that he was buying the house for his 
law-firm partner.36 In reality, the attorney bought the house for the 
defendants, whom the plaintiffs considered “undesirable and 
objectionable as tenants or purchasers.”37 The plaintiffs were 
unquestionably defrauded,38 but they suffered no pecuniary losses 
from the sale of the house, as the court expressly acknowledged.39 
The court nonetheless decided that the plaintiffs are entitled to void 
the conveyance they made for the following reasons: 
 
The plaintiffs had the right to dispose of their house to whom 
they would. The defendants fraudulently combined to 
deprive them of this right, and equity will not suffer them to 
retain the fruits of their deceitful trickery.40 
 
An interesting and potentially more critical question that arises in 
connection with this case is whether the court should also have 
remedied the wrong done to the plaintiffs had their house been 
resold to a bona fide purchaser prior to the proceeding. Under this 
scenario, the plaintiffs would not have been entitled to equitable 
annulment of the conveyance41 and could only ask for compensatory 
relief.42 To obtain such relief, they would have had to prove their 
damage. Because the plaintiffs showed unequivocal resolve to sell 
their house for the amount they received from the defendants’ 
clandestine agent, their first-order right as owners of the house 
remained intact. The deprivation they suffered only affected their 
second-order entitlement to make an autonomous decision about 
selling or not selling the house. 
                                                   
35  Brett et al. v. Cooney et al., 53 A. 729 (Conn. 1902). 
36  Id. at 730. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. at 730-31. 
40  Id. (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
41   See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—
RESTITUTION (2d ed., 1993) § 4.7(1) at 451 (attesting that bona fide 
purchasers acquire prevailing legal title). 
42   The question of how to assess compensation for harms to autonomy is an 
intricate one. We address it head on in Part III, infra. 
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Harm to autonomy consists of the nullification of the person’s will as 
a free human being. In the case at bar, the Bretts were unwilling to 
sell their house to the Cooneys, but the Conneys and their 
clandestine agent overrode this decision by fraud.43 This 
nullification of the Bretts’ will violated their autonomy: it made them 
chessmen in the clandestine game played by the unwanted buyers of 
their house. The resulting harm to the Bretts’ autonomy was 
unquestionably serious and warranted compensation. 
 
Autonomy’s role as, what we call, a second-order right is 
fundamental. Yet, it has not received the attention it deserves from 
scholars and judges. In what follows, we address this omission by 
explicating the nature of the harm to an individual’s autonomy that 
results from an infringement of her first-order right.  
 
In Brett v. Cooney,44 the rightholders’ autonomy was violated by 
fraud. Fraud, however, is not the only means by which a person’s 
autonomy can be violated. Autonomy can also be violated by force 
or compulsion. Consider the textbook property case of Jacque v. 
Steenberg Homes45 that featured an intentional violation of the right 
of property owners to exclude others from their property. In that 
case, a mobile-home company plowed a path through the plaintiffs’ 
field to shorten the delivery of a mobile home to a customer.46 Prior 
to committing this intentional trespass, the company’s crew asked 
for the plaintiffs’ permission to cross the field, but the plaintiffs’ 
refused to grant that permission.47 The company’s manager then 
told his team to “get the home in there any way you can”48 and the 
team followed that order.49 Based on these facts, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court overturned the appellate court’s decision to vacate 
the punitive damage award granted to the plaintiffs by the trial court 
                                                   
43  Brett, 53 A. at 730-31. 
44  Id. 
45  Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
46  Id. at 163–66. 
47  Id. at 157. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
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and obligated the company to pay the plaintiffs $100,000 in punitive 
damages.50 
 
Commentators justified this decision based on deterrence theory, 
suggesting that in order to discourage intentional transgressions on 
property rights it was necessary to award punitive damages in this 
case.51 A different justification, proffered by Professor Keith Hylton, 
focused on the psychological harm to the plaintiffs, who previously 
lost part of their property to an adverse possession claim.52 Our 
autonomy-focused account suggests a very different perspective on 
the case. The plaintiffs saw their autonomy sacrificed: they were 
enlisted against their will to promote the defendant’s business.53 
Instead of honoring the plaintiffs’ right to rule their property, the 
defendant made itself a temporary ruler of that property.54 Although 
                                                   
50  Id. at 160-61, 164. 
51   See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 83, 87 (2007) (“Courts reason that, because compensatory damages in 
these cases are often nominal or very small, higher ratios are needed to deter 
and punish reprehensible conduct that results in harm to the plaintiff beyond 
any monetary loss.”). 
52  See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 
GEO. L.J. 421, 445 & n.78 (1998). 
53  See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 81-83 (2009), who makes the same argument as a 
justification for forcing autonomy violators to disgorge their profits to the 
victim. Specifically, he writes that “if I manage to enlist you in support of my 
projects without your consent, I must surrender to you any gains I make as a 
result. I must do so because the use I made of your right to set your own ends 
must be treated as an embodiment of your freedom, and so given back to 
you.” Id. at 82-83. 
54  Forced use of another person’s property that causes the owner no tangible 
harm has a historic illustration in English law: Watson Laidlaw & Co. Ltd. v. 
Pott Cassels & Williamson (A Firm), 1914 S.C. 18 (H.L.). This case features 
the following statement by Lord Shaw: 
 For wherever an abstraction or invasion of property 
has occurred, then, unless such abstraction or 
invasion were to be sanctioned by law, the law 
ought to yield a recompense under the category or 
principle, as I say, either of price or of hire. If A, 
being a liveryman, keeps his horse standing idle in 
the stable, and B, against his wish or without his 
knowledge, rides or drives it out, it is no answer to 
A for B to say: “Against what loss do you want to be 
restored? I restore the horse. There is no loss. The 
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it did so for a short period of time, the plaintiffs’ experience of being 
disempowered and dominated by the defendant amounted to a 
serious and irreversible harm that called for compensatory relief.55 
The difficulties in meting out the right amount of compensation did 
not make that call weaker.56 
 
Autonomy can also be violated by accident. Consider an actor who 
negligently causes fire that destroys another person’s building. The 
wrongdoer in this example inflicts two distinct harms on the 
property owner: the destruction of her building and the obliteration 
of her second-order right to use the building according to her 
autonomous vision.57 The first type of harm consists of the 
unrealized rental value of the building and the cost of its 
restoration.58 This sum, however, does not compensate the 
rightholder for the harm to her autonomy. As in our previous 
examples, this additional harm manifests itself in the rightholder’s 
disempowerment: her lost ability to make and carry out meaningful 
choices with regard to her property. Prior to the building’s 
                                                   
horse is none the worse; it is the better for the 
exercise.  Id. at 32. 
 This statement has recently been rationalized as a rightholder’s entitlement 
to recover compensation for the loss of his Hohfeldian “power” to insist on 
his right and stop the right’s infringement. See Barker, supra note 14, at 647-
52. This rationalization interprets Hohfeldian “power” too broadly. Under 
Hohfeld’s account, legal power represents its holder’s ability to effect a change 
in the underlying legal relations. Hohfeld, supra note 29, at 44-45. 
55  Note that a property owner’s right against trespass allows for emergency 
trespassing that aims to rescue people, animals and chattels. Under this 
exception, the trespasser must pay the owner the market price for the 
occupation of the owner’s property. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, 
Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1823, 1850-52 (2009), and 
sources cited therein. 
56  We address these difficulties below in Part III. 
57  Cf. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1727-
31, 1755--56 (2004) (defending a decentralized property system that supports 
owners’ idiosyncratic uses); Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control 
and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 565 (2016) (rationalizing 
entrepreneurs’ motivation to buy controlling stock in a corporation by their 
desire “to pursue business strategies that they believe will produce above-
market returns by securing the ability to implement their vision in the manner 
they see fit.”). 
58  See DOBBS, supra note 41, § 5.2 at 500-01, § 5.15 at 562 (describing repair-
based and rent-based compensation as a remedy for asset destruction). 
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destruction, the rightholder’s control over her destiny was more 
effectual than after that accident. The wrongdoer therefore should 
be obligated to compensate the rightholder for the erosion of her 
autonomy, in addition to paying her for her economic damage. 
 
Although our account is decidedly non-utilitarian, we believe that 
our core claim is equally persuasive from an economic standpoint. 
From the perspective of economic efficiency, autonomy confers a 
valuable option upon a rightholder that allows her to decide whether 
and when to exercise her right. According to economic theory, 
options are important assets that are valuable by virtue of their very 
existence.59 As such, they are bought and sold on markets and are a 
standard feature in contractual arrangements. Naturally, when an 
option holder is unlawfully deprived of the decision-making power, 
represented by the option, she suffers a loss. The loss can be large or 
small, depending on the particular circumstances and the nature of 
the option, but irrespectively of the magnitude of the loss, in 
principle, compensation ought to be paid to the option holder. 
 
This economic insight escaped the attention of the California 
Supreme Court when it decided the landmark case Moore v. 
Regents of University of California.60 This case involved a leukemia 
patient whose treatment required the removal of his spleen and 
withdrawals of blood, bone marrow aspirate and other bodily 
substances.61 Unbeknownst to the patient, his doctors used these 
biomaterials for research.62 As part of that research, they developed 
and patented a cell-line from the patient’s T-lymphocytes.63 The 
California Supreme Court held that the doctors’ duty to obtain the 
patient’s informed consent to the treatment obligated them to tell 
the patient about their research and economic interests in his cells 
and that their failure to do so vitiated his consent to the treatment.64 
The Court, however, affirmed the demurrer of the patient’s suit for 
                                                   
59  See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL 
ENTITLEMENTS 2 (2005). 
60  Moore v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied 499 
U.S. 936 (1991). 
61  Id. at 481. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. at 481-82. 
64  Id. at 483-86. 
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conversion that included a plea to recognize his proprietary interest 
in the biotechnological products that the doctors might create from 
his cells or the patented cell-line.65 The Court decided that human 
cells cannot be a subject of ownership both conceptually and for 
policy reasons.66 The Court also ruled that the patient’s ownership 
claim was doomed to fail anyway because the cell-line patented by 
the defendants “was both factually and legally distinct from the cells 
taken from [his] body.”67 
 
This decision glossed over the fact that the patient’s entitlement to 
prevent the doctors’ use of his biomaterials had an option value. The 
patient may not have owned these materials under the “title” and 
“possession” criteria, but he was entitled to veto their use by other 
people.68 This entitlement and its option value were part and parcel 
of the patient’s right to make autonomous decisions about his 
body.69 As such, it incorporated the patient’s prerogative to demand 
remuneration for allowing others to use his biomaterials for research 
and commercial purposes. The violations perpetrated by the doctors 
affected primarily this entitlement: its effect on the patient’s right to 
be informed about the treatment he received from the doctors was 
marginal and relatively insignificant. Because the patient and his 
attorneys made no complaints about that treatment, it was safe to 
assume that it was adequate, if not more than adequate, from a 
medical standpoint. The patient’s harm from the informed-consent 
violation therefore was purely dignitary. As such, it entitled the 
patient to recover only a modest amount in compensation.70 This 
                                                   
65  Id. at 487-92. 
66  Conceptually, the Court explained that people neither possess nor have a title 
in their cells and that cells consequently cannot be converted. Id. at 488-89. 
Policy-wise, the Court reasoned that requiring scientists to investigate the 
consensual pedigree of human cells “would affect medical research of 
importance to all of society” and involve “policy concerns far removed from 
the traditional, two-party ownership disputes in which the law of conversion 
arose.” Id. at 487. 
67  Id. at 492. 
68  See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (N.Y. 
1914) (Cardozo, J.) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has 
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body…”). 
69  Id. 
70  See, e.g., Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 701 So. 2d 447, 455-56 (La. 1997) (allowing 
$5000 in dignitary damages for “deprivation of self-determination” and 
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amount falls way below the sum that the patient could demand—
and potentially receive—for allowing his doctors and the institutions 
that employed them—to use his biomaterials for research and 
commercial purposes. The Court’s categorization of the patient’s 
infringed entitlement as a right to informed consent, rather than as 
an autonomous choice to sell the permission to use his biomaterials, 
therefore clearly shortchanged Moore.71 
 
These observations are not merely theoretical. A recent 
experimental study, carried out by Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez, Cass 
Sunstein and Tali Sharot, confirms that people strongly value their 
autonomy and are willing to pay for it.72 Participants in the study 
were given a task and offered a monetary reward for successfully 
performing it. They were also given an option to delegate the task to 
an expert. The results were striking: participants overwhelmingly 
preferred to retain control over their tasks, instead of allowing the 
expert to perform the task on their behalf.73 Critically, most 
participants did not change that preference when delegating the task 
to the expert promised them a higher reward.74 Instead, they paid 
the “control premium” in order to act as free agents.75 
II. Positive Law 
The current stand of the law on harms to autonomy is, at best, 
unprincipled, and, at worst, anomalous. The legal landscape, insofar 
as harms to autonomy are concerned, has been largely shaped by 
the injuria absque damnum doctrine that denies redress to victims 
of wrongdoing who sustained no tangible damage, physical or 
proprietary. By focusing exclusively on tangible damages and 
                                                   
surveying precedents upholding modest amounts of compensation for 
dignitary harm). 
71  Cf. Joanne Belisle, Note, Recognizing a Quasi-Property Right in Biomaterials, 3 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 767 (2013) (alluding to personal autonomy to justify an 
individual’s quasi-property right in her cells and other biomaterials). 
72  Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez, Cass R. Sunstein & Tali Sharot, The Intrinsic 
Value of Choice: The Propensity to Under-Delegate in the Face of Potential Gains and 
Losses, 2017 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-
017-9259-x. 
73  Id. at 9-10. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 11. 
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ignoring other types of harm, the injuria absque damnum doctrine 
has led to the virtual effacement of autonomy harms, rendering 
them, by and large, a legal nullity.  
 
Over time, though, the no-compensation rule has been riddled with 
sporadic exceptions in a myriad of legal contexts—primarily medical 
malpractice and constitutional law—that entitled victims to 
compensation for violation of their rights, even without tangible 
harm. Astoundingly, even in those cases, courts have not referred to 
the victims’ autonomy interest when recognizing their right to 
redress.76 Rather, courts chose to invoke questionable legal 
constructs, such as “presumed harm”77 or to grant nominal damages 
to victims and then supplement the award with punitive damages.78 
In addition, at times, courts based victims’ right to redress on the 
theory of dignitary harms.79  
 
As we show, the legal tools courts employ to provide remedy to 
victims of wrongful acts that resulted in no tangible harms created a 
baffling array of doctrines that lack a coherent basis. More 
importantly, we demonstrate that focusing on the victims’ autonomy 
provides a superior way to do justice to wronged rightsholders.80 
 
A. Injuria Absque Damnum 
Among the many shortfalls of extant law, the doctrine of injuria 
absque damnum (or injuria sine damno) stands out as most salient.81 
                                                   
76  See infra Sections II.B. and II.C. 
77  See infra Section II.B. 
78  See infra Section II.C. 
79  See infra note 105 and materials cited therein. 
80  Tacit recognition of autonomy losses can also explain the rule not allowing 
wrongdoers to deduct their victims’ unwanted benefits from the 
compensation they must pay the victims. For example, when a wrongdoing 
that injures the victim forces her to change her job into a more profitable one, 
the wrongdoer cannot deduct the victim’s additional income from the 
medical expenses, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, for which 
he must compensate the victim. The extra leisure time “gained” by the victim 
is not deductible either. Cf. Ariel Porat & Eric Posner, Offsetting Benefits, 100 
VA. L. REV. 1165, 1187-88 (2014). 
81 See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Int. Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 246 (1913) 
(Pitney, J., dissenting) (“The result is, the legal paradox: Injuria sine damno. 
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This doctrine recognizes harmless, and hence nonactionable, 
violations of rights as a real possibility.82 Correspondingly, it holds 
that a right’s violation does not by itself entitle the victim to recover 
redress: the victim also needs to show that the violation caused her 
cognizable harm.83 Courts apply this doctrine in a variety of contexts 
to deny remedy,84 and even standing,85 to any plaintiff who fails to 
demonstrate that the defendant’s transgression made her worse off 
economically or materially.86 
                                                   
The plaintiff is wronged, but not harmed; it may sue, but may not recover”). 
For an illuminating historical and critical discussion of the “injury in fact” 
requirement for having a cause of action, see F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, 
Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275 (2008). 
82  See, e.g., Crawford v. Davis, 134 S.E. 247, 252 (S.C. 1926) (holding that the 
“Injuria Sine Damno” principle is among the fundamentals of liability and 
that a plaintiff needs to show damage to have a cause of action against the 
violator of his entitlement). 
83  See, e.g., cases cited above in notes 81-82; Brown Oil Tools, Inc. v. Schmidt, 
148 So.2d 685, 687-88 (Miss. 1963) (“If the negligent act or omission has 
resulted in no injury or loss to anyone, it is merely  injuria sine damno, 
although it involved violation of a statute or ordinance.” (citing Phillips v. 
Delta Motor Lines, Inc. et al., 108 So.2d 409, 415 (Miss. 1959))); 
Uppinghouse v. Mundel, 2 N.E. 719, 722 (Ind. 1885) (“[W]here an 
unauthorized act results in [no, sic.] detriment or loss to another, if it is not a 
damage in contemplation of law, it is injuria sine damno. Conceding, 
therefore, that by the transaction complained of the appellant was compelled 
to pay a debt which, by reason of our exemption laws, could not then have 
been collected from him in this state, and that, under the circumstances and 
in consequence, much annoyance and inconvenience were inflicted upon him 
in his business, no injury, in contemplation of law, resulted to him from the 
transfer of the debt in question.”). For a general discussion of this principle, 
as related to standing, see Hessick, supra note 81, at 289-305. 
84  See supra notes 81-83 and cases cited therein. 
85  Hessick, supra note 81, at 306-315. 
86  During the course of history, this doctrine had its challengers. See Ashby v. 
White, 1 Eng. Rep. 417, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 955 (1703) (H.L.) (“It is impossible 
to imagine any such thing, as injuria sine damno. Every injury imports 
damage in the nature of it.”); Mayor of London v. Mayor of Lynn, 126 Eng. 
Rep. 1026, 1041 (1796) (H.L.) (“[T]he inference seems unavoidable that 
damages actually sustained could not be of the essence of the action, and that 
the right alone was essential.”); Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579, 585 
(1851) (Exch.) (“Actual perceptible damage is not indispensable as the 
foundation of an action; it is sufficient to shew the violation of a right, in which 
case the law will presume damage; injuria sine damno is actionable....”). For 
an insightful analysis of this important challenge and its implications for the 
American system of remedies, see John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status 
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This doctrine is flawed when applied to rights. For any right that 
promotes its holder’s interest, “harmless transgression” is a 
contradiction in terms.87 As we explained in Part I, every rightholder 
has a second-order entitlement to do with her right as she pleases. A 
right’s violation always denies the rightholder that entitlement and 
reduces her autonomy. For that reason, it can never be harmless.88 
Consider the following case: After contracting with Bob to sell him 
her property at an agreed-upon price, Susan sells the property to 
Andy—an unsuspecting bona fide purchaser who sees the value of 
the property plummet one month later on account of a real estate 
bubble that burst. In this case, Susan’s breach of contract causes Bob 
no economic harm. Yet, it violates Bob’s autonomy by annulling his 
rightful decision to buy the property. Reasons motivating that 
decision lie within the scope of Bob’s autonomy and are not part of 
Susan’s legal dominion. Susan has no right to decide for Bob 
whether he should or should not buy her property, but this is exactly 
what she did when she breached the contract. Under extant law, 
nonetheless, the court will not obligate Susan to compensate Bob for 
the harm to his autonomy.89 
                                                   
of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE 
L.J. 524, 548-49 (2005). 
87  The right not to be harmed by another person’s negligence—the cornerstone 
of our accident law—was designed not to accrue in the absence of harm. 
Under this design, negligent conduct that causes a prospective victim no harm 
does not infringe any vested entitlement and thus does not amount to a 
transgression. See W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 1 at 4 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter: PROSSER & KEETON) (“a 
wrong is called a tort only if the harm which has resulted, or is about to result 
from it, is capable of being compensated in an action at law for damages....”). 
88  Barker, supra note 14, at 639-40, acknowledges that forced use of another 
person’s property can be conceptualized as a violation of that person’s 
autonomy. According to him, however, “If loss of autonomy were itself an 
actionable head of damage in private law, it would be hard to avoid sliding to 
the conclusion that every rights infringement should give rise to a license fee 
damages award.” Id. at 640 (emphasis in original). This argument skips over 
the core characteristic of autonomy as incorporating every rightholder’s 
second-order entitlement to do with her right as she pleases. Under this 
understanding of autonomy, law indeed should provide remedy for every 
nontrivial infringement of a right. 
89 See DOBBS, supra note 41, § 12.4.(2) at 777 (observing in connection with the 
breach-of-contract remedies that “The causation in fact requirement 
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This hypothetical scenario stands in a stark contrast with the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s “informed consent” decision, Matthies v. 
Mastromonaco.90 Comparison between those two cases unveils yet 
another problem with the injuria absque damnum doctrine: the 
problem of horizontal inequity. Courts applying this doctrine grant 
remedies for autonomy violations in some cases while refusing to 
grant those remedies in other cases that are equally strong. In 
Matthies, an orthopedic surgeon prescribed bed rest to an elderly 
patient suffering from severe backaches, without discussing with her 
the possibility of having a back surgery.91 The surgeon thought that 
such discussion was unnecessary because the patient had porous 
bones that could not hold orthopedic screws.92 New Jersey’s 
informed consent law derives doctors’ disclosure obligations from a 
reasonable patient’s expectations—a broad standard that obligates 
doctors to inform patients about all available treatments, including 
those that the medical profession does not recommend.93 Based on 
that standard, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the patient 
had a viable suit against the surgeon for violation of her “informed 
consent” right.94 The negative value of the foregone surgery option, 
which involved a potential collapse of the patient’s bone structure 
and the resulting threat to the patient’s life, did not prevent the court 
from issuing this ruling.95 According to the court, the choice between 
the risky surgery option and the bed rest that confined the patient to 
her home and made her dependent on help belonged to the patient 
rather than the doctor.96  
 
By making the harm to the patient’s autonomy actionable despite 
the total absence of any economic damage, the court opened up the 
possibility for the patient to recover compensation for her 
noneconomic harm. This possibility has been recognized by a 
                                                   
prevents the plaintiff’s recovery for any losses not proven to have occurred at 
all....”). 
90  Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456 (N.J. 1999). 
91   Id. at 458. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. at 462. 
94  Id. at 464. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
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number of courts that interpreted the patient’s right to informed 
consent as part of her broader entitlement to self-determination,97 in 
tune with the seminal precedent, Canterbury v. Spence.98 This legal 
development99 has removed harms to medical patients’ autonomy 
from the “injuria absque damnum” category. As a result, patients 
like Mrs. Matthies are often able to recover compensation for their 
autonomy losses under the doctrine of lack of informed consent, 
while other rightsholders whose rights are violated cannot get their 
day in court, let alone receive a remedy. Our examples of Bob, the 
property buyer, and Mrs. Matthies, the ailing patient, may be 
different in degree, but are not different in kind from a rights, or 
autonomy, perspective. Both of them involve wrongfully inflicted 
harm to a person’s autonomy. Hence, if Mrs. Matthies deserves to 
recover compensation for her autonomy loss, denying a similar 
remedy to Bob will be manifestly inequitable. 
 
The “injuria absque damnum” doctrine originates in the law of 
torts.100 Under our torts system, when Angela takes a negligent 
                                                   
97  See, e.g., Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 96-1757, p. 15 (La. 10/10/97); 701 So. 2d 
447, 455 (allowing dignitary damages for “deprivation of self-determination” 
and “insult to personal integrity”). 
98  Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that a 
doctor must present his patient with all possible alternatives that a reasonable 
person would consider when deciding on their medical treatment). See also 
Howard v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 800 A.2d 73, 
78 (N.J. 2002) (relying on Canterbury v. Spence to affirm a “patient-centered 
view of informed consent [that] stresses the patient’s right to self-
determination”). 
99  This development can be traced back to Justice Cardozo’s seminal decision 
in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) 
(“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault for which he is 
liable in damages.”). For full doctrinal layout of the autonomy-driven doctrine 
of informed consent, see Katherine Shaw & Alex Stein, Abortion, Informed 
Consent, and Regulatory Spillover, 92 IND. L.J. 1, 10-19, 29-31 (2016). 
100  See, e.g., McVickers v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 194 F.Supp. 848, 849 (E.D. 
Mich. 1961) (“It is basic tort law that wrong without damage does not 
constitute a good cause of action.”); Fields v. Napa Milling Co., 330 P.2d 459, 
462 (Cal.App. 1958) (reviewing and explaining the traditional tort doctrines 
of “injuria absque damno” and “damnum absque injuria” as standing for the 
proposition that “a wrong without damage does not constitute a cause of 
action for damages any more than damage without wrong does not ordinarily 
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action that puts Victor’s person or property in danger, but ultimately 
causes Victor no cognizable damage, as well as no emotional harm 
such as fear, shock or anxiety, she owes no duty to Victor to 
compensate him.101 In this and similar cases, the victim’s good luck 
inures to the benefit of the wrongdoer.102 Critically, though, this rule 
only applies to accidental endangerments, as opposed to intentional 
and malicious torts.103 Wrongdoers acting intentionally or 
maliciously against another person are generally held liable to pay 
their victims dignitary and other noneconomic damages, and 
punitive damages as well.104 These remedies are intended to provide 
adequate compensation to victims for their autonomy losses.105 
 
Application of the “injuria absque damnum” doctrine to accidental 
torts is perfectly justified. When a negligent action causes the 
prospective victim no physical injury, emotional harm or 
                                                   
constitute a cause of action.”); Brown Oil Tools, Inc. v. Schmidt, 148 So.2d 
685, 687-88 (Miss. 1963) (stating the same principle). 
101  See supra notes 82, 83, 100 and cases cited therein. 
102  Id. 
103  See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 87, § 8 at 37 (observing that in intentional 
tort cases “[m]ore liberal rules are applied as to the consequences for which 
the defendant will be held liable” and that courts tend to allow plaintiffs to 
recover compensation without presence of a tangible harm). See also David G. 
Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. 
REV. 363, 376 (1994) (“When an actor intentionally violates the rights of 
another person, the actor “steals” the victim’s autonomy, reflecting an 
assertion that the thief is more worthy than the victim. If such thefts of 
autonomy were not subjected to penalties in addition to the restoration of the 
stolen goods (compensatory damages), the rectification of the transaction 
would be incomplete. This is because such theft transactions contain two 
distinct components: (1) the transfer of goods from the victim to the thief and 
(2) the deliberately wrongful nature of the transfer in violation of the plaintiff 
‘s vested rights—the illicit transfer of freedom from the victim to the thief.”). 
104  See DOBBS, supra note 41, § 3.11(1) at 312. See also BMW of North America, 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (setting up constitutional criteria for 
imposing punitive damages, including reprehensibility of the wrongdoer’s 
conduct); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 
(2003) (reaffirming and applying the Gore guideposts). 
105  See Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: 
Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 282-83 (2005) (identifying 
dignitary and emotional-distress damages among available reliefs for choice 
deprivation); see generally DOBBS, supra note 41, § 7.3(2) at 635 (specifying when 
dignitary damages are awarded). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382579 
AUTONOMY.DOC 5/4/2019 1:35 AM 
24  AUTONOMY [Vol. nnn:nnn 
 
proprietary deprivation, it also inflicts no damage on the victim’s 
autonomy.106 The reason is obvious. A would-be victim of a non-
materialized accident experiences no forced restrictions on her 
decisions and actions. She moves along with her plans without facing 
any restraint or compulsion attributable to the negligent actor. Her 
will encounters no unlawful interference by another person. No one 
enlists her to promote his plans. 
 
With property, contracts and other transactional areas of private law 
things are different. Contracts induce one party to rely on another 
party’s undertakings and modify her plans and actions in accordance 
with that reliance.107 Breach of contract thus always harms the 
innocent party’s autonomy—a harm that does not depend on 
whether that party suffers economic damage as well.108 
Consequently, there is no good reason for expanding the “injuria 
absque damnum” doctrine from accidents to transactional law. 
Unfortunately, a number of courts did exactly this, thus entrenching 
the flawed concept of “harmless transgression.”109 
                                                   
106  Here, the no-compensation rule also serves an economic purpose by helping 
the system to identify the most efficient enforcer of the applicable safety 
standard. See Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs that Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the 
Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1199, 
1219-20 (2001) (explaining that tort victims are best positioned to enforce 
safety standards because they have superior information and motivation to 
sue); Steven Shavell, A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence 
Rule over Regulation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 278-85 (2013) (showing that 
liability triggered by harm brings about substantial savings in the law 
enforcement effort relative to ex ante regulation of accident risks). 
107  See Kar, supra note 12, at 761 (unfolding a descriptive account of contract law 
as aiming “to empower people to use promises as tools to influence one 
another’s actions and thereby to meet a broad range of human needs and 
interests.”). 
108  See DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL 
THEORY OF CONTRACT 133 (2005). 
109  See, e.g., Bediako  Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 850 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2012), 
aff’d, 537 F. App’x 183 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying the doctrine of injuria absque 
damnum to deny damages in a credit case); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus 
Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D.Conn.), aff’d 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(applying the doctrine of injuria sine damno to an antitrust violation); Kane 
v. Nomad Mobile Homes, Inc., 228 N.E.2d 207, 208 (Ill.App.1st Dist. 1967) 
(ruling in a breach of contract dispute that since “there were no damages in 
the claim of plaintiff ... the court should have entered a judgment against 
plaintiff under the doctrine of injuria sine damno.”). 
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B. Nominal and Punitive Damages 
One technique courts use to mollify the harsh result of the injuria 
absque damnum doctrine is to award nominal damages for rights 
violations and then supplement the award with punitive damages. 
This option allows courts to use even very minimal pecuniary or 
property losses as a basis for granting remedy to rightsholders and 
then use it as a launching pad for punitive damages. The celebrated 
property case, Jacque v. Steenberg Home,110 in which the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court upheld the imposition of substantial punitive 
damages, in combination with nominal damages of $1, as a 
compensation for forcible trespass, is one such example.111 A more 
recent example is the 2011 decision of the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia in Feld v. Feld that also dealt with 
intentional trespass.112 The court applied the District of Columbia 
rule that denies courts the power to impose punitive damages “unless 
there is a basis in evidence for actual damages, even if only nominal 
in amount.”113 Based on this rule and on the summary of the general 
law in the Restatement of Torts,114 the court allowed the aggrieved 
landowner “to seek punitive damages in addition to nominal 
damages for his trespass claim.”115 
 
Another example is the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in 
Nappe v. Anschelewitz.116 In that case, the defendants convinced the 
plaintiff to invest his money in their business venture in exchange for 
a share in that venture.117 Shortly after making that investment, the 
plaintiff discovered that the defendants diverted his money to 
support another business.118 The agreement between the parties still 
guaranteed the plaintiff the agreed-upon percentage of the profits 
from the venture in which he wanted to invest, and the plaintiff 
                                                   
110  Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
111  We discuss this case in Part I: see supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text. 
112  Feld v. Feld, 783 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C. 2011). 
113  Id. at 76 (internal quotation omitted) (citing Maxwell v. Gallagher, 709 A.2d 
100, 104–05 (D.C. 1998)). 
114  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 cmt. e. 
115  Feld, 783 F.Supp.2d at 76. 
116  Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 477 A.2d 1224 (N.J. 1984). 
117  Id. at 1227. 
118  Id. at 1227-28. 
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therefore suffered no tangible harm from the defendants’ fraud.119 
Based on these facts and after ascertaining the role of compensatory, 
nominal, and punitive damages in our system of remedies,120 the 
court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to recover nominal and 
punitive damages from the defendants.121 “[C]ompensatory 
damage,” it explained “is not a requisite element of legal fraud.”122 
According to the court, “Even if the person relying on the falsehood 
were unable to establish actual damages, he should be entitled to 
vindicate his rights through an award of nominal damages and in 
appropriate cases to punish the defendant through an award of 
punitive damages.”123 
 
A final and perhaps most striking illustration of the use of punitive 
damages to compensate for autonomy harms can be found in a 
recent Canadian court decision, Abramowicz v. Lee, that won global 
notoriety.124 The plaintiff, Abramowicz, was a prodigal clarinetist, 
whose lifelong dream was to study at  the Coburn Conservatory of 
Music in Los Angeles—a stellar institution that offered him full 
scholarship and an opportunity to study under the guidance of an 
internationally renowned clarinet pedagogue.125 He applied and was 
successfully admitted. Alas, the admission decision never reached 
him. Unbeknownst to him, the defendant, his girlfriend at the time, 
fearing that he may leave her to pursue his lifelong dream, 
intercepted Coburn’s acceptance email and, in its stead sent the 
plaintiff a fabricated rejection email.126 She then entered the 
plaintiff’s email system and assuming his identity informed Coburn 
that he decided to decline. Despite the enormous setback he 
suffered, the plaintiff managed to become an accomplished 
                                                   
119  Id. 
120  Id. at 1230-32. 
121  Id. at 1232-33. 
122  Id. at 1233. 
123  Id. at 1232. 
124 See Sarah Mervosh, A Clarinetist’s Girlfriend Didn’t Want Him to Leave. So She 
Crushed His Dreams., NEW YORK TIMES, June 15, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/arts/clarinetist-ex-girlfriend-
rejection-lawsuit.html. 
125 Abramovitz v. Lee, 2018 Ont. Sup. Ct. 3684 (Canada), 
https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2018/2018onsc3684/2018onsc3
684.html. 
126 Id. 
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professional musician, although the path to success was much 
longer, expensive and treacherous.127  
 
Years later, the plaintiff serendipitously discovered what had 
happened and sued his ex-girlfriend for damages.128 The court 
readily awarded him $334,000 for his pecuniary losses—the loss of 
Coburn’s full scholarship and the two-year delay in his career.129 But 
the plaintiff also requested compensation for a non-pecuniary harm 
represented by the “deflection of his life.” Recognizing this claim, 
the court granted the plaintiff $25,000 in aggravated damages “in 
modest recognition of the anguish and hurt that has cost [him] no 
money, but which has nonetheless hurt him.”130 
 
C. Presumed Damages 
Another doctrine courts use to grant relief in cases of harm to 
autonomy—without recognizing it as such, of course—is the 
presumed damages doctrine.131 This doctrine, as interpreted by the 
United States Supreme Court, applies in suits for injuries that are 
“likely to have occurred but difficult to establish.”132 In any such suit, 
the court has the power to award the plaintiff damages that “roughly 
approximate the harm that [she] suffered and thereby compensate 
for harms that may be impossible to measure.”133 This power, 
however, does not allow courts to award compensation to plaintiffs 
who suffered no cognizable harm.134 Presumed damages, as the 
Supreme Court explained, are merely “a substitute for ordinary 
compensatory damages.”135 
 
                                                   
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131   See DOBBS, supra note 41, § 7.1(2) at 624-25 (outlining rules authorizing courts 
to award plaintiffs’ presumed damages and observing that these rules reflect 
“a desire to value some rights in themselves and not because they are 
instruments of physical safety or emotional tranquility.”). 
132  Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 311 (1986). 
133  Id. 
134  Id. at 310. 
135  Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Courts have asserted their power to award presumed damages in 
cases involving violations of substantive constitutional rights: for 
example, the right to free speech or the right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.136 Consider the case of a citizen who was 
denied her right to vote—a possibility that was discussed in the 
obiter dictum of several cases.137 Unable to find a “real” harm to the 
citizen, but unwilling to condone the wrong done to her, courts 
suggested that the aggrieved citizen is entitled to legal recourse based 
on the epistemically contentious notion of “presumed damages.”138  
 
Courts have also resorted to the “presumed damages” doctrine in 
determining compensation for victims of defamation139 and other 
dignitary torts.140 Unfortunately, the caselaw neither provides a 
policy basis for presuming harm in certain cases (but not in others) 
nor a principled method for identifying the rights whose violations 
should trigger a presumption of harm. It is possible to argue as a 
matter of logic that certain rights (or interests) are more important 
than others. We are even willing to accept this proposition, 
arguendo. Importantly, however, this assumption does not help one 
to make sense of the presumed damages doctrine. Note that the 
presumed damages doctrine focuses on harm, not on rights. A 
violation of a right either results in harm, or it doesn’t. The 
importance of the right involved cannot change this simple fact.141 
Nor can the nature of the particular violation involved dictate, 
without empirical support, whether harm should be presumed.  
                                                   
136  See Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that 
presumed damages can be awarded as a compensation for violation of the 
right to vote); City of Watseka v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 
1558-59 (7th Cir. 1986) (awarding presumed damages for violating First 
Amendment right to free speech). 
137  Stachura, 477 U.S. at 311; Hessel, 977 F.2d at 301. 
138  Stachura, 477 U.S. at 311; Hessel, 977 F.2d at 301. 
139  See, e.g., W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1154-59 (N.J. 2012). 
140  Id. at 1159. See also Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 760-61 (1985) (approving presumed damages award to victim of 
defamation). 
141  The United States Supreme Court indeed held that the presumed damages 
doctrine was designed to afford compensation for real harm and there is 
consequently “no room for non-compensatory damages measured by the 
jury’s perception of the abstract “importance” of a constitutional right.” 
Stachura, 477 U.S. at 309-10. 
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Our core insight that every right violation results in harm to 
autonomy obviates the need to rely on tenuous legal presumptions, 
as well as the need to devise cardinal or ordinal rankings of rights. 
By our lights, courts should simply award redress for violations of 
autonomy.142 As we explained in Part I, autonomy violations cause 
victims real, rather than presumed, losses and deprivations.143  
III. Remedying Autonomy Harms 
The current stand of the law not only fails to do justice to the 
important value of autonomy, which constitutes an indispensable 
component of every right, but also renders the law unfair and 
inconsistent. The law, in its present form, systematically 
undercompensates rightsholders for autonomy deprivations, save in 
those few cases in which harms to autonomy are actionable. Worse 
yet, by undermining rightsholders’ autonomy, extant law deflates 
the value of the rights themselves. 
 
The doctrine’s effect on individuals who suffer an autonomy harm 
that exceeds their tangible harm from a right’s violation is 
particularly unjust. Such victims stand to receive a 
disproportionately small amount of compensation that falls way 
short of making them whole. As we noted, some courts attempt to 
help such victims, without recognizing the root cause of the problem, 
by awarding them presumed damages or a combination of nominal 
and punitive damages.144 Not only does the use of these doctrines 
fall short of offering a comprehensive solution to the problem, but it 
                                                   
142  Cf. Mike Steenson, Presumed Damages in Defamation Law, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1492, 1492 (2014) (“Despite heavy criticism, the presumed damages 
rule has had remarkable staying power in American law.”). 
143  Under our framework, harm to autonomy would often subsume the victim’s 
dignitary harm. This, however, will not happen in every case. There will be 
cases in which the victim’s dignitary harm will be both separate from and 
more severe than the harm to her autonomy. See, e.g., Abner v. Kansas City 
S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 164-65 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming award of $1 in 
nominal damages and $125,000 in punitive damages per person as a remedy 
for racist slurs that created working environment hostile to African-American 
employees in violation of Title VII). 
144  See supra, Sections II.B. and II.C. 
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also creates a secondary set of distortions. Because the doctrines of 
presumed, nominal and punitive damages are discretionary in their 
nature and are not tailored for autonomy harms, their use 
engendered doctrinal uncertainty not only in the context of 
autonomy harms, but also in the law of remedies in general. The 
caselaw, outside the special area of medical malpractice, masks 
autonomy harms by omitting specific reference to them, and 
sporadically uses general doctrines to grant redress to victims on 
other grounds. This ad hoc approach makes the law unpredictable, 
inconsistent and inequitable.  
A. Recognizing Autonomy Violations  
We submit that the current state of affairs calls for a comprehensive 
reform. Lawmakers ought to formalize a cause of action for 
violations of autonomy and allow redress for autonomy losses. 
Under the proposed rule, all victims who incurred an autonomy 
harm would be able to get their day in court and receive a remedy 
for the harm they suffered, unless the harm is trivial and thus 
identified as de minimis.145 A full-fledged legal recognition of 
autonomy as a protected interest would bring about fuller protection 
of rights. It would also have the salutary effect of restoring the 
integrity of judges, who would no longer need to resort to specious 
doctrines, such as presumed harms, and artificial imposition of 
punitive damages to grant compensation for harms to autonomy. 
Any proposal to afford legal redress to autonomy harms must take 
account of two concerns. The first is valuation. Autonomy harms 
cannot be readily measured. There are no objective criteria, or 
benchmarks, that can be used to assess such harms, and their 
magnitude varies from one victim to another. The second concern 
has to do with administrability. The formalization of an independent 
cause of action for harms to autonomy and the addition of such 
harms to the list of remediable losses will, no doubt, increase the 
workload of courts and introduce delays in the administration of 
justice. Both concerns are real and valid but are not insurmountable.  
It should be noted at the outset that our legal system is no stranger 
to interests and harms that are not amenable to precise 
                                                   
145  See Section IV.A. below. 
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quantification. Privacy, consortium, and protection against infliction 
of pain and suffering, for example, are all interests that do not readily 
lend themselves to objective evaluation.146 Like autonomy, they are 
highly individualized and person-specific. The extent and, indeed, 
very existence of harms to those interests often depends on private 
information that cannot be verified by objective evidence. Yet, our 
legal system has long recognized such harms as actionable and 
granted relief for them.147 
 
As importantly, our system has moved in the direction of awarding 
compensation to rightsholders without proof of harm, when it is 
clear that there was a breach of a right, but the resulting harm is 
unclear or difficult to prove.148 This trend is reflected in the doctrine 
of presumed damages149 and, on an even broader scale, in the 
proliferation of statutory damage provisions.150 Statutory damages 
perform two distinct remedial tasks. They provide a means of 
recompense to rightsholders without proof of actual harm when the 
rightsholders suffer a loss that is either unclear or difficult to 
prove.151 Statutory damages are also available to rightsholders who 
prefer to forego provable claims for actual damages and to receive 
the statutorily determined amounts instead.152  
 
One possible way of overcoming the ascertainability and verifiability 
problems that attend autonomy harms is to use defendants’ profits 
as the benchmark of compensation. On this option, disgorgement 
will become the remedy of choice in all cases.153 The principal 
advantage of disgorgement is that it is predicated on an objective 
measure that can be verified by courts, at least in principle.  
 
                                                   
146  DOBBS, supra note 41, § 3.1 at 211, § 8.1(5) at 660-61. 
147  Id. 
148  See supra, Section II.C. 
149  Id. 
150  See generally, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in 
Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009). 
151  See Colin Morrissey, Behind the Music: Determining the Relevant Constitutional 
Standard for Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3059, 3071 (2010). 
152  Id. See also id. at 3072.  
153  Cf. RIPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 81-83 (justifying disgorgement as a remedy for 
violations of a freedom conceptualized here as autonomy). 
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Disgorgement, however, suffers from three major flaws in the 
present context. First, many wrongdoers realize no cognizable gain 
from autonomy violations. Other wrongdoers generate profits that 
courts cannot expediently ascertain and evaluate. Second, and more 
importantly, there is no relation whatsoever between the 
wrongdoer’s profit and the victim’s autonomy loss.  The harm to the 
victim’s autonomy may exceed the wrongdoer’s ill-gotten gain or fall 
below it. Severe injuries to autonomy may result in small gains, or 
no gain at all, to the wrongdoer—as in the case where Alan pushes 
Beth against her will.  Conversely, wrongful acts that produce 
significant gains for the wrongdoers may cause only minimal injuries 
to the victim’s autonomy, as in the case where Carol uses Dylan’s 
phone without his permission to make a mega trade on the stock 
exchange market. Third, and finally, although disgorgement of 
profits constitutes an objective benchmark, it only partially alleviates 
the administrability problem. Oftentimes, assessing the wrongdoer’s 
ill-gotten profits is difficult, if not altogether impossible. At the end 
of the day, therefore, using the wrongdoer’s profits as the benchmark 
for compensation will not economize on judicial resources and will 
not adequately compensate victims for harms to their autonomy.  
 
B. Compensating for Autonomy Harms 
For nontrivial, and hence actionable, autonomy violations we 
propose setting up a two-pronged compensation scheme that 
combines a fixed component and a discretionary component. The 
fixed component would consist of a predetermined statutory award 
to be granted in all cases of autonomy violations. The discretionary 
component would be left to the court’s discretion and be limited to 
cases of egregious autonomy violations.  The discretionary amount 
would always come on top of the fixed amount, and, naturally, it 
would vary from case to case.  
 
There are two principal ways to determine the fixed compensation 
amount. The fixed award, or premium, can be a set dollar amount 
or, alternatively, a percentage of the monetary damages awarded to 
plaintiffs for their other losses. If set in pure dollar terms, the fixed 
amount awarded for autonomy losses would bear no direct 
relationship to the plaintiff’s economic losses. If the option of 
percentage-based premium is selected, compensation for autonomy 
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losses would be derived from the economic harm suffered by the 
plaintiffs.  
 
We believe that in most cases percentage-based compensation is 
clearly preferable to the alternative of set dollar compensation 
divorced from economic harm. Yet, percentage-based 
compensation would not work when autonomy harms are 
unaccompanied by economic losses. This challenge may be 
particularly acute in the context of violations of constitutional rights. 
For example, violations of one’s right to free speech, to vote, to equal 
protection, and not to endure illegal searches often inflict small or 
no pecuniary losses, while leading to considerable autonomy harm. 
 
There are two solutions to this challenge. The first solution would 
be to incorporate a presumption in favor of percentage-based 
compensation, but allow courts discretion to order the statutorily set, 
non-percentage-based amount, in those cases in which the plaintiff 
suffered no significant economic losses. The second solution would 
be to let the plaintiff choose her preferred method of compensation. 
Under this alternative, a successful plaintiff will have the option of 
selecting between percentage-based premiums and set amounts 
premiums. The second option reinstates the victim’s autonomy 
better than the first because it gives the victim the power to select 
the calculation method for her autonomy losses.   
 
As far as the discretionary component of the compensation is 
concerned, it should be designed to enable courts to step up 
compensation awards in cases involving particularly severe harms to 
autonomy. The wrongdoer’s blameworthiness is an obvious 
aggravating factor.  Autonomy losses resulting from intentional and 
malicious behavior warrant higher compensation than losses 
resulting from merely incidental transgressions. All else being equal, 
when a person promotes her own self-interest while intentionally or 
maliciously disregarding the rights of another person, the resulting 
harm to the victim’s autonomy will usually be greater than the harm 
to her autonomy from an accidental transgression. 
 
Another important factor that lawmakers ought to consider in 
adopting a compensation scheme for autonomy losses is the 
distinction between harms to autonomy associated with pecuniary 
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or property losses and harms to autonomy that grow out of bodily 
injuries. We believe that, in principle, violations of a person’s bodily 
integrity result in a greater harm to her autonomy than wrongdoings 
against her pecuniary or property interests. This presupposition 
should be reflected in the compensatory scheme in the following 
way: there should be a rebuttable presumption that autonomy losses 
resulting from violations of bodily integrity should be compensated 
at a higher amount, or premium, than autonomy losses associated 
with violations of property or contractual rights. Incorporating such 
a presumption into our compensation scheme would not only help 
courts to form accurate assessments of autonomy harms. It would 
also introduce predictability into our model and enhance the 
expressive function of the law’s responses to wrongdoings.   
 
Importantly, we do not categorically rule out the possibility of 
awarding punitive damages to plaintiffs for egregious violations of 
their autonomy. Such awards, however, should be reserved for 
extreme cases, where courts believe that the wrongdoer’s behavior 
was so reprehensible in terms of its effect on the victim’s autonomy 
that it ought to be addressed by a stricter measure. Punitive damages 
awards should be rare and the conditions under which they will be 
granted should be clear.154 Otherwise, courts will be flooded with 
punitive damages requests. 
 
By our lights, the award of punitive damages in Jacque v. Steenberg 
Home and Abramowicz v. Lee was warranted. However, the disparity 
between the awards highlights the problem of punitive damages. In 
Jacque v. Steenberg Home, the plaintiffs were awarded $100,000 in 
punitive damages although they suffered no property damages and 
the trespass, albeit intentional, lasted only a few minutes. In 
Abramowicz v. Lee, by contrast, the plaintiff received only 25,000 
Canadian Dollars in punitive damages, even though the defendant, 
through her actions, derailed his life. From reading the cases, one 
may emerge with the feeling that the amount awarded to the Jacques 
was too high or that the compensation won by Abramowicz was too 
low—or both. The adoption of our remedial scheme would inject 
                                                   
154  See DOBBS, supra note 41, § 3.11 at 312 (stating that punitive damages are 
generally awarded against defendants “found guilty of particularly aggravated 
misconduct”). 
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much needed coherence into this area of the law, and, in particular, 
would give rise to two benefits. First, by affording direct 
compensation for autonomy losses, it would dramatically reduce the 
use of punitive damages. Second, the parameters we specify for 
computing compensation can instruct judges and juries in assessing 
punitive damages awards, which should lead to more consistency.   
 
IV. Addressing Potential Objections 
In this Part, we address three potential objections to our proposal. 
The first objection concerns the proposal’s administrability. The 
crux of the argument is that implementation of our proposal will 
overwhelm the courts by dramatically increasing litigation. The 
second objection holds that courts actually afford redress for 
autonomy losses, but they do so implicitly, or indirectly, via other 
legal doctrines, without expressly acknowledging this fact. In other 
words, courts mask autonomy violations under the guise of other 
doctrines. We term this argument the “masking objection.” Third, 
an argument can be made that our remedial mechanism does not 
facilitate accurate assessment of autonomy harms and would 
therefore result in insufficient or excessive compensation. We call 
this argument the “inaccuracy objection.” 
A. Administrability 
The first potential objection we would like to address is the 
implementability, or administrability, of our proposal. Many readers 
may be sympathetic to the idea of offering redress for autonomy 
harm, but at the same time, worry that doing so is impractical in 
light of the limited financial resources of the court system. 
Recognizing autonomy harms, so the argument goes, would lead to 
the filing of innumerous new lawsuits and drive courts to the 
breaking point. Mindful of this concern, we propose several 
safeguards that are intended to avert this result. First, we would 
allow lawsuits for autonomy harms only in those cases in which a 
recognized legal right of the victim has been violated. In other 
words, under our proposed scheme, claims of autonomy violations 
would be actionable if and only if another, first-order, right of the 
victim was violated. Accordingly, it would not be possible to sue for 
autonomy violations on a standalone basis. Thus, the 
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implementation of our proposal would not lead to filing of new 
lawsuits. Second, we call on courts to apply a stringent de minimis 
limitation to autonomy violations. The point and purpose of this 
requirement is to sift out claims of autonomy violations that resulted 
in insignificant or minor harms to autonomy. Third, we would bar 
recovery for autonomy losses in cases in which the loss is subsumed 
in an economic or property harm. By obviating the need to consider 
autonomy losses for which the victim has been indirectly 
compensated, the ban on double-recovery does not only promote 
fairness but also administrability. 
  
(1) The Independent Cause of Action Requirement 
Under our vision, not every autonomy violation would be 
actionable. Only violations arising from the breach of a recognized 
right would entail an actionable autonomy violation. Hence, an 
individual would be allowed to seek redress for an autonomy 
violation only if she can show that the same act or omission that 
brought about the autonomy harm constituted a breach of 
recognized legal right. Hence, only individuals who have a 
recognized cause of action in tort, contract, property, constitutional 
law, and the like would have standing to sue for an autonomy 
violation.  
It is important to see that this limitation does not arise solely from a 
desire to protect judicial resources. Rather, it is endemic to our 
analytical framework. Recall, that under our conceptualization the 
autonomy component accompanies recognized (first-order) rights. It 
allows a rightholder to decide whether and how to exercise her right. 
Where there is no legally protected right there is no legally protected 
autonomy interest that deserves protection. Our goal in this Essay is 
not to protect every choice, but only those choices that come with 
the grant of legal rights.  
Hence, not every time someone is adversely affected by the behavior 
of another, she will be able to sue for an autonomy violation. The 
activities of other individuals affect our lives daily. The decisions of 
the government, on all levels, routinely restrict our choices, even 
freedoms. To give a simple example, the decision of my municipality 
to rezone my neighborhood can have a profound effect on my life 
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choices. Similarly, the behavior of strangers often forces us to change 
our plans. A slow driver on a narrow road may prevent me from 
reaching my destination in a timely fashion. Furthermore, the 
decision of a fellow train commuter to speak on the phone on the 
train may upset my plan to read or work on the train. All of these 
examples involve autonomy violations writ large. Yet, those 
violations do not merit redress because they are free-standing: the 
alleged violator does not detract from a legally recognized right of 
the alleged victim. 
Contrast the previous examples, with cases in which an individual is 
denied a dwelling because of her race or gender or is forced to speak 
against her will. In these cases, the victim will be able to sue not only 
for the violation of her first-order right, but also to seek legal redress 
for her autonomy harms.  
The picture that emerges is clear. The implementation of our 
proposal would neither inundate courts with new lawsuits, nor 
would it facilitate the filing of suits that cannot already be brought. 
Thus, the concern that implementation of our scheme would 
paralyze the courts is wildly exaggerated. Allowing parties to recover 
for autonomy losses would certainly increase the workload of courts, 
but it is highly unlikely to drive courts to the breaking point. What 
is more, the two other measures to which we turn next, would 
further reduce the burden that our proposal would place on the 
judiciary. 
(2) De Minimis  
The second safeguard courts should use to avert the risk of excessive 
litigation is stringent application of the de minimis doctrine. This 
doctrine holds that “de minimis no curat lex”—an expression 
commonly translated to “the law does not concern itself with 
trifles.”155  
  
                                                   
155  For a classic account of the de minimis doctrine, see Max L. Veech & Charles 
R. Moon, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 45 MICH. L. REV. 537, 544-60 (1947) 
(specifying and analyzing the criteria courts use to identify harms as de 
minimis). 
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The de minims doctrine is intended to ensure that minor infractions 
of the law that do not result in significant harm are kept out of the 
courtroom. A strict application of this doctrine to autonomy harms 
would ensure that only autonomy violations that inflict a real and 
substantial harm on the victim would be litigated. The adoption of 
this measure is necessary to protect the two most valuable resources 
of the judiciary: time and budget. 
 
In light of the budgetary constraints faced by the legal system, it 
cannot afford to remedy every minor violation of a person’s 
autonomy.  When the harm resulting from an autonomy violation is 
relatively insignificant, allowing the victim to sue the violator would 
impose on the legal system unaffordable costs while creating no 
offsetting benefits. The legal system therefore must sift out trivial 
suits in order to save its limited resources for more important 
matters. Hence, insignificant violations of a person’s autonomy 
should yield the person no right to compensation. For example, 
assume that while attempting to board a subway train during rush 
hour, two passengers rub shoulders at the doorstep of one of the cars. 
Despite the unconsented contact, no lawsuit should be allowed. The 
harm in this case is so trivial that it should be dismissed as de 
minimis. Or, consider a case of a driver who trespasses a few inches 
onto another person’s driveway while turning her car around on a 
narrow street.156 This trespass temporarily overrides the owner’s 
autonomous choice to exclude others from his property, but this 
deprivation is minimal and thus should not be recognized as 
actionable in our courts of law. Things, however, would be different 
in intentional trespass cases such as Jacque v. Steenberg Homes,157 
in which the trespasser turns the owner into an instrument to 
promote its goals. Such violations of autonomy do not qualify as 
trivial because of the victim’s experience of being overpowered and 
subordinated by the wrongdoer.  
 
Another paradigmatic example of a de minimis violation of 
autonomy is an employer’s breach of an at will employment 
agreement. Such breaches do not and should not go unpunished. 
                                                   
156  See Veech & Moon, supra note 155, at 550-51 & n. 60 (stating that courts treat 
technical trespass as de minimis). 
157  563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
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They call for compensatory relief, but the relief should only cover 
the employee’s pecuniary, as opposed to autonomy, losses. Because 
the employer can terminate the employment relationship at will 
while paying the employee for her pecuniary losses,158 the residual 
harm to the employee’s autonomy is minimal and thus does not 
merit compensation. 
(3) Subsumption 
We would also bar recovery for autonomy harms in cases in which 
the harm is subsumed in the alleged victim’s pecuniary loss. The 
paradigmatic example is liquidated damages. Liquidated damages 
are supposed by hypothesis to reflect all the losses a party stands to 
incur in the case of a breach. By agreeing to a liquidated damages 
provision, a party effectively consents to accept the stipulated 
amount as compensation for all of her expected losses. Hence, if the 
contract is breached, she should be precluded from arguing that she 
should receive an additional amount of money for her autonomy 
harm.159  
 
By the same token, in the case of violations of certain constitutional 
rights, the pecuniary loss and the autonomy harm are one and the 
same. The denial of a free speech right or the right to vote may inflict 
no pecuniary loss on the rightholder, but will set her autonomy back. 
In such cases, double compensation is unwarranted; a single amount 
should fully compensate the rightholder for her loss. With other 
constitutional rights, however, things are different: violation of those 
rights typically triggers two distinct losses. For example, unlawful 
discrimination oftentimes inflicts a pecuniary loss—as with victims 
who find themselves overcharged or underpaid because of their 
                                                   
158 See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (“Either party may 
terminate an employment relationship with or without cause unless the right 
to do so is limited by a statute, other law or public policy, or an agreement 
between the parties, a binding employer promise, or a binding employer 
policy statement.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW  § 
2.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008) (“The courts in 49 states recognize 
the principle that the employment is presumptively an at-will relationship.”). 
159  We assume here that the contact is valid and enforceable and was neither 
consummated under duress nor tainted by unconscionability, fraud, 
misrepresentation, or illegality. 
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gender or race—as well as an autonomy loss represented by the 
choice the victim was denied.160  
 
Another category in which autonomy harms should not be 
compensable is that of assumption of risk. An individual who choose 
out of her free will to engage in an extreme sport or adventurous 
activity should not be entitled to receive compensation for autonomy 
harms if she gets injured.161 Importantly, this result should obtain 
even when the law allows actors to secure compensation for their 
physical injury by invalidating contractual waivers on public policy 
grounds.162 Arguing for an autonomy harm in such cases is 
antithetical to the very concept of autonomy. And while it is perfectly 
legitimate for society to provide compensation for victims who 
assumed a risk that materialized and suffered an injury as result on 
paternalistic or utilitarian grounds,163 it would be a stretch to allow 
compensation for an autonomy harms in such cases.  
 
B. Masking 
The masking objection goes to the very premise of our project. It 
maintains that although courts do not openly recognize victims’ 
right to recover compensation for autonomy violations, they 
implicitly (and clandestinely) address the problem via other 
doctrines. Hence, it is not true that autonomy violations are not 
addressed by our courts; rather, they are accounted for indirectly. 
 
We find this argument unpersuasive, even mystifying. Our review of 
court decisions revealed no evidence of tacit recognition of 
autonomy losses. On the contrary, in the majority of the cases we 
                                                   
160 See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky & Stephen F. Befort, Employment Discrimination 
Remedies and Tax Gross Ups, 90 IOWA L. REV. 67, 71 (2004) (distinguishing 
between different kinds of economic and noneconomic damages from 
employment discrimination). 
161 See, e.g., Alex Stein, The Domain of Torts, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 575-76 
(2017) (stating the rules governing assumption of risk). 
162 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 213–214, at 541-46 (2000) 
(outlining rules invalidating waivers of the right to sue for personal injury). 
163 Id. (explaining the effectiveness and the ineffectiveness of waivers of the right 
to sue for personal injury). 
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discussed throughout the Essay, courts could indirectly account for 
the victim’s autonomy losses, but openly elected not to do so.164 
 
To be sure, one can insist that if courts chose to omit or camouflage 
references to autonomy violations, no scholar would find them in the 
caselaw. While it is impossible to disprove this argument, it is a very 
odd one. As a threshold matter, it is not clear why courts would be 
interested in concealing autonomy violations and how they 
collectively arrived at this policy. Furthermore, it is equally unclear 
what bonding mechanism judges employ to influence new judges to 
abide by this policy and never deviate from it. The theory that judges 
would go to such great lengths to mask autonomy violations simply 
defies logic.  
 
We have another reason for rejecting the masking argument as a 
basis for objecting to our reform proposal. Assuming, arguendo, that 
this argument accurately portrays the existing legal practice, is that 
practice normatively attractive? We think it is not, for a fairly simple 
reason. As Joseph Raz has pointed out, legal rules ought to be “open 
and adequately publicized.”165 Legal rules need to possess sufficient 
specificity, clarity, as well as formality, in order to minimize the 
potential for arbitrariness and prejudice on the part of judges and 
jurors who make decisions about individuals’ rights, duties and 
liabilities.166 This fundamental requirement applies with full force to 
an individual’s right to autonomy. This right and the remedies that 
respond to its violations are too important to stay hidden in the 
interstices of informal practice. 
 
                                                   
164 The California Supreme Court’s decision in the famous Moore case, analyzed 
in Part I, is a prime example of this approach. As we demonstrated, this 
decision characterized a blatant violation of the plaintiff’s autonomy, which 
denied him the option to demand remuneration for biomaterials taken from 
his body, as a patient’s right to receive from his doctors all information 
relevant to his treatment. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text. This 
characterization, as we explained, had a negative effect on the plaintiff’s 
compensation entitlement. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
165 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 214 (1979). 
166 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 667-68 (1984). 
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Finally, we think that even if for some unfathomable reason courts 
remedy autonomy violations without explicitly acknowledging it, it 
is paramount to make this reality explicit. For all the reasons 
discussed in this Essay and the scholarship it cites167, autonomy is an 
important value. As such, it should be openly and expressly 
protected by our legal system.  
 
B. Inaccuracy 
The inaccuracy objection proceeds in two steps. The first step is 
predicated on our own acknowledgment that accurate 
compensation for autonomy losses is impossible and impracticable. 
The second step consists of the inference that since accurate 
compensation is unachievable, the law should award victims of 
autonomy violations no compensation at all.  
 
While we openly admit that our mechanism cannot generate perfect 
information about autonomy losses, we disagree with the claim that 
it should lead lawmakers to adopt a no-compensation regime. To 
begin with, we believe that the inaccuracy objection is grossly 
overstated. As we mentioned earlier in this Essay, imprecise 
compensation mechanisms pervade our legal system and are used as 
a matter of course in a myriad of legal contexts, ranging from 
private, to administrative, to constitutional law.168 Of course, as a 
matter of pure logic, the pervasiveness of imprecise compensation 
mechanisms does not, on its own, call for adopting yet another such 
mechanism: doing so will likely do more harm than good. 
 
Yet, we believe that this is clearly not the case. The law regularly 
employs imperfect compensation mechanisms for a reason: they are 
supported by a powerful rationale that holds true in the case of 
autonomy as well. These remedial mechanisms generate benefits 
that outweigh their costs. These mechanisms, despite their 
imprecision, promote fairness by providing compensation to victims, 
and enhance efficiency by deterring wrongdoers. If these 
                                                   
167 See supra notes 1-5, 16-24 and accompanying text. 
168  See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text. 
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mechanisms did not exist, wrongdoers would be motivated to 
advance their own self-interest at their victims’ expense.  
 
The same calculus justifies our remedial framework for autonomy 
violations. As we demonstrated in Part I, autonomy rights are 
important to their holders and to society in general. Fending off 
autonomy violations is consequently important as well. We therefore 
believe that the benefits of our proposed framework for remedying 
autonomy violations outweigh its administrative costs. Furthermore, 
we anticipate that those costs will decline over time as courts will 
formulate compensation criteria that can be used in future cases. 
Conclusion 
Autonomy undergirds rights.   It is indispensable to the definition of 
rights and their functioning. Yet, to date, the law refuses to recognize 
the interdependence between autonomy and rights and, as a rule, 
offers no redress for autonomy losses. The current legal regime is 
unprincipled and indefensible. Not only does it fail to acknowledge 
the conceptual importance of autonomy, but it also shortchanges 
rights, undercompensates rightsholders and often leaves them 
without any redress for their most severe losses.  
 
In this Essay, we reexamined the case for protecting autonomy from 
three different perspectives: conceptual, normative, and doctrinal. 
Conceptually, we demonstrated that autonomy is best understood as 
a second-order right and that every breach of a legally recognized 
right invariably implicates an autonomy violation. Normatively, we 
have established the desirability of affording full legal protection to 
autonomy as a necessary prerequisite for respecting rights. 
Doctrinally, we developed a mechanism for compensating for 
autonomy losses that takes full account of the limitations of our legal 
system.  
 
At the end of the day, our analysis yields a clear thesis: autonomy is 
the cornerstone of all rights, and as such deserves to be explicitly and 
universally honored by our legal system. 
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